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Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a virtual
revolution in financial intermediation. One innova-
tion is securitization: the packaging of loans into
pools that are funded by marketable securities. At
the same time, the selling of individual loans has
itself grown tremendously over this period. While
individual loans are primarily sold to other depos-
itory institutions, securitization involves the sales
of securities to nonbank investors as well. Both
loan sales and securitized loan pools are broadly
identified as asset-backed lending.
A financial asset is a claim to future cash flows
as stipulated by the issuer. What distinguishes
asset-backed lending is that the securities involved
are backed by specific financial assets and then
sold. Alternatively, these financial assets might
have been pooled and funded by issuing general
claims on the firm. Instead, when a loan is either
securitized or sold individually, it is funded sepa-
rately rather than with the other assets on the bal-
ance sheet of the loan originator.
l Hence, loan
sales and securitization, from the perspective of
the seller of the asset-backed securities, are a
means of off-balance-sheet finance.
The proliferation of asset-backed lending has
been commonly viewed as a response to com-
petitive and regulatory pressures, which have
prompted institutions to participate in credit
markets in ways that are not directly reflected
on their balance sheets. In particular, capital re-
quirements are cited as reducing the profitability
of funding certain investments on-balance-sheet
with deposit liabilities. However, nonbank firms
that are not subject to the regulations associated
with the federal safety net are also engaging in
asset-backed financing. This indicates that there
are important nonregulatory incentives for loan
sales and securitization.
Asset-backed lending has become an impor-
tant mode of funding for particular types of credit.
Though depository institutions are the primary
originators of home mortgages, more than 40 per-
cent of these claims are ultimately financed
through the government-sponsored secondary
mortgage market. In the past several years, how-
ever, asset securitization has spread beyond
government-sponsored sales of mortgage-backed
• 1 Although securitized loan pools are funded separately, they are
frequently sold with some type of recourse, which means that they are
partially backed by the general claims of the firm that originated the loan.securities to include private pools that are backed
by increasingly diverse types of loans, from
credit-card receivables to Third World debt. Cur-
rently, more than 15 percent of consumer install-
ment credit is funded through securitization.
2
The evolution of financial market innovations
in tandem with changing banking regulations
makes it difficult to assess what is driving the
trends in asset-backed markets. Because we wish
to evaluate why asset-backed lending occurs in
the absence of regulations, we examine how
successful economists have been in applying
formal models to this phenomenon. Although
off-balance-sheet funding can arise for either
market-based or regulatory-based reasons, we
focus on four papers that attempt to model asset-
backed lending in the absence of government-
sponsored insurance and regulations.
We first outline the general nature of inter-
mediation and describe asset-backed markets in
this context. Information costs have long been
viewed as a rationale for financial intermedia-
tion. The literature on asset-backed lending has
picked up on this theme to argue that loan sales
and securitization are also best understood as a
means of minimizing information costs. There-
fore, in order to understand some of the models
that have attempted to formalize asset-backed
lending, we first discuss several models of finan-
cial contracting under imperfect information,
which have been useful in characterizing the
roles that financial intermediaries play in chan-
neling credit.
3 Finally, we analyze how existing
government policies may affect the incentives
for firms, primarily banks and thrifts, to engage
in these activities.
I. An Overview of
Intermediation
In a decentralized economy with significant in-
formation and transaction costs, the financial
sector affects how resources are channeled from
lenders to borrowers. As financial conduits, in-
termediaries pool lenders' resources to fund a
portfolio of claims on many, often diverse, bor-
rowers. In doing so, intermediaries are said to
conduct indirect finance, allowing them to issue
indirect claims with cash flows that differ in vary-
ing degrees from those of the borrowers. Thus,
intermediaries perform asset transformation in
making their investment and funding choices.
To the extent that information is costly to ob-
tain, financial contracts and institutions also can
reduce the information costs associated with
channeling resources to the most productive in-
vestment opportunities. Thus, intermediation
yields more attractive portfolio choices for inves-





Three of the types of asset transformation pro-
duced by intermediaries are 1) denomination
transformation, 2) credit risk transformation,
and 3) maturity transformation. How effectively
these methods can mitigate information costs is
an important part of our subsequent analysis.
Denomination transformation allows inter-
mediaries to lend to borrowers with large credit
needs by issuing smaller-denomination claims
to many savers. For example, mutual funds that
invest in government bonds and Treasury bills
pool the funds of a group of small investors to
fund a portfolio of relatively similar claims.
Denomination transformation also allows small
savers to diversify by enabling them to hold a
wider variety of investments.
Credit risk transformation pools the resources
of many lenders to fund several projects. This al-
lows intermediaries to diversify the risks of the
assets in their portfolios, and thus to issue in-
direct claims to investors with a more predict-
able return than the individual assets being
funded. This is the main role of stock or bond
mutual funds, although most intermediaries
engage in credit risk diversification.
Finally, intermediaries also perform maturity
transformation by issuing indirect claims that
offer a pattern of promised cash flows different
from those promised by borrowers. Banks and
thrifts are noted for the degree of maturity trans-
formation in their portfolios. They fund medium-
and long-term projects by issuing short-term
liquid deposits that serve as close substitutes for
legal tender.
4 Contractual savings institutions,
such as insurance companies and pension funds,
• 2 See Federal Reserve Bulletin, Domestic Financial Statistics,
Table 1.55, Consumer Installment Credit, March 1993.
• 3 Two important papers surveying this literature are Gertler (1988)
and Bhattacharya and Thakor (1991).
• 4 McCuiloch (1981) emphasizes that this degree of maturity trans-
formation is actually "misintermediation" that reflects the regulatory in-
centives for banks to assume credit risks as well as the risk associated
with mismatching the durations of their assets and liabilities.produce a very different sort of cash flow trans-
formation. They fund portfolios of assets by sell-
ing contracts promising cash flows that are
contingent on specific events, such as property
loss, death, or retirement.
Much of the intermediation associated with
these types of asset transformation channels funds
to borrowers who place debt or equity directly in
credit markets. A distinguishing characteristic of
some intermediaries is that they specialize in lend-
ing to borrowers who would find it prohibitively
costly to obtain funds through direct market place-
ments because of the relative costs associated
with screening, monitoring, and servicing their
claims. Depository institutions and finance compa-
nies, for example, profit by developing a compara-
tive advantage in lending to small or information-
intensive borrowers. Thus, some intermediaries
are special in the sense that they provide lenders





In contrast to funding a portfolio of assets by
the issue of unsecured claims, asset-backed
lending is an alternative funding mode by
which an asset or set of assets is sold by its
originator. We use the term asset-backed lend-
ing to refer to both securitization and individual
loan sales.
A loan sale is usually made by a bank to
another bank, and involves no asset pooling in
and of itself.
5 However, the process of making
loans marketable, by increasing the access of
other lenders to investment opportunities, can
improve the allocation of credit. Loan sales in-
volve transactions between two (or more) finan-
cial institutions, whereas securitization generally
involves the sale of claims (against the securi-
tized asset portfolio) to individual investors who
hold these in their portfolios for investment pur-
poses. Consequently, securitized claims are
priced like other capital-market instruments, but
loan sales are priced based on bilateral (multi-
lateral) negotiations.
Alternatively, nonmortgage securitization
usually takes the form of a bank or nonbank
firm funding a pool of similar assets by forming
a subsidiary that markets claims to the pool to
• 5 For a comprehensive overview of the loan sales market, see Gor-
ton and Haubrich (1990).
nonbank investors. These pools are generally
originated by large firms. From the perspective
of the pool originator, however, nonmortgage
securitization is basically a means of separating
the financing of certain assets from that of its
general portfolio.
Finally, securitization of mortgages takes
place in the secondary market in order to fund
pools of insured mortgages. These pools in-
clude claims from many, often geographically
diverse, mortgage originators. This form of se-
curitization simultaneously creates a pool of sim-
ilar loans (mortgages) purchased from loan
originators in different localities. Hence, a unique
characteristic of mortgage-backed securities is




A major difference between loan sales and
securitization is that loan sales usually provide
no recourse for the party buying the loan. Most
view this as the result of regulators' treatment of
loan sales in their assessment of capital ade-
quacy requirements for depository institutions.
Banks and thrifts are not required to hold capi-
tal against loans sold, except for those sold with
recourse, which are treated as if they are on-
balance-sheet items in determining capital ade-
quacy. Thus, given the incentives to maximize
leverage, these institutions tend to sell loans
without recourse to truly "get them off the
regulatory books."
Securitization, on the other hand, is generally
associated with the provision of some form of
credit enhancement that increases the market-
ability of the asset-backed securities. One common
form of enhancement for securitized assets is
backing by a bank-issued standby letter of credit
(SLC). For a stipulated fee, banks issue SLCs,
which are promises to insure the purchasing party
up to a prespecified amount for losses incurred on
the securitized loans. Before a loan pool is funded,
both the loans and the bank issuing the SLC are
rated. Because the rating of the pool is affected by
the rating of the bank issuing the guarantee, the
extent to which this method of credit enhance-
ment is used is limited. Moreover, to avoid regu-
lated capital assessments, a bank securitizing a
pool of loans usually does not issue the credit-
enhancing SLC. Thus, the originator of the pool is
generally not also its guarantor.
An increasingly popular enhancement, the
cash-collateral-account method, has the pooloriginator covering potential losses with cash
placed in an escrow account. Another method to
enhance loan quality is to overcollateralize the
loan pool. That is, extra loans are included in
the pool so that the value of the loans exceeds
the value of the securities issued to fund it.
Why Fund Off-
Balance-Sheet?
Given the attributes of asset pooling, it is natural
to question the benefit of funding a loan or pool
of loans off-balance-sheet. The answer, of
course, is that this method is more efficient—
less expensive—than on-balance-sheet fund-
ing. As we have asserted, asset-backed lending
is commonly viewed as a response to both regu-
latory costs and market incentives.
In its early years, regulations were clearly an
important factor motivating securitization via the
secondary mortgage market.
6 Regulated branch-
ing restrictions in tandem with information costs
caused banks and thrifts to operate in relatively
localized markets. The government-sponsored
secondary mortgage markets allowed these institu-
tions to hold portfolios from many different parts
of the country. These regulatory restrictions are
less important today. This suggests that informa-
tion costs are becoming the more relevant deter-
minant of interregional lending.
A fundamental role of intermediation is to
produce the information involved in channeling
credit in the most cost-effective way. In particular,
lenders do not always have good information
about the risk and return of borrowers' investment
opportunities. Intermediaries specialize in produc-
ing this information, as well as in structuring and
servicing contracts. Therefore, in order to under-
stand why off-balance-sheet funding may be
more efficient, it is useful to examine the roles of
both financial contracts and intermediation in
mitigating information costs.
Here, the primary focus is on market incen-
tives—specifically due to information costs—as
a motive for asset-backed lending. In the follow-
ing section, we discuss several models of finan-
cial contracting and intermediation. We then
proceed to examine why asset originators might






Even in a world where there is complete informa-
tion about available investment opportunities,
credit intermediation can occur if individuals
without wealth have more profitable projects than
do those with greater financial resources. How-
ever, while intermediation can help in diversifying
the portfolios of the individuals supplying finan-
cial resources, the nature of the claim on these in-
vestment projects is uncertain. In particular, as
Modigliani and Miller (1958) state, it is not clear
why a project should be funded via a debt con-
tract, which stipulates a predetermined promised
cash flow and default (should that cash flow not
be met), versus an equity contract, which prom-
ises only to pay a cash flow that is contingent on
the project's return—precluding the event of de-
fault. Modigliani and Miller show that in a world
without taxes, transaction costs, and information
costs, entrepreneurs would be indifferent between
funding projects with debt or equity.
Debt versus
Equity Contracts
Information costs thus play an important role in
explaining the structure of the contracts between
borrowers and lenders that we observe in reality.
One model of financial contracting under imper-
fect information is presented in Townsend
(1979). He demonstrates that when it is costly
for lenders to monitor the performance of a
borrower's project, debt contracts allow lenders
to minimize monitoring costs.
7 In his model,
borrowers can observe the proceeds of their in-
vestment opportunities, while lenders can do so
only by paying a fee. In this setting, an equity-
type contract stipulating a payoff that always
depends on the project's realization implies that
investors will always have to expend resources
to monitor the project's outcome.
Alternatively, debt contracts minimize these
monitoring costs by specifying a contractual inter-
est payment to lenders. Borrowers pay this pre-
specified amount except when default is declared.
In that situation, lenders receive the realized value
of the project (or firm), which they must ascertain
• 6 See Pavel (1986) for a comprehensive description of the histori-
cal evolution of this market.
• 7 This suggests that debt would be preferred to equity. One reason
equity might be preferred is if bondholders cannot observe the riskiness
of the investments undertaken by the firm's management. In that situa-
tion, the investments undertaken will be too risky, which transfers wealth
from bondholders to equityholders.by incurring monitoring costs. Here, debt con-
tracts minimize monitoring costs because
lenders must monitor investment outcomes





One function of financial intermediation, as
mentioned earlier, is to pool assets in order to
reduce portfolio risks, thus enabling investors
with limited wealth to hold a diversified
portfolio. Another, indirect advantage of diver-
sification is that it helps to minimize information
costs by decreasing the need for investors to
monitor privately observed portfolio risks.
Diamond (1984) examines how asset diversi-
fication by banks mitigates the need for depositors
to monitor the performance of bank investments.
He describes a world in which information about
realized project returns is costly. If many lenders
are needed to fund one borrower, an intermediary
could group these lenders to fund the project.
However, because the project's return is costly to
observe, each lender would in general have to
monitor the intermediary's investment.
Diamond demonstrates that by diversifying
across many projects, an intermediary can
decrease the variability of the return on its port-
folio, and thus the need for lenders to monitor
the performance of the portfolio. Depositors in
essence loan funds to the bank in exchange for
debt contracts. A reduction in portfolio risks
lowers expected monitoring costs by reducing
the probability that the firm will default on its
liabilities by not paying depositors their stipu-
lated return. In the extreme case, complete
diversification of asset returns eliminates portfo-
lio risk and thus the need for depositors to mon-
itor the bank. Hence, Diamond describes how
asset pooling allows the monitoring function to
be delegated to intermediaries.
9
• 8 This result is predicated on the assumption of deterministic
auditing. That is, auditing occurs with a probability of either one or zero.
Mookherjee and Png (1989) show that, in general, random auditing will
be optimal. That is, even when bankruptcy occurs, the probability of
being audited is less than one.
• 9 Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that financial intermedi-
aries will also arise with ex ante monitoring costs. Diamond's paper as-




Diamond's analysis illustrates an interesting
point, but in more realistic settings, firms may be
limited in how much they can benefit from asset
pooling. This restriction is useful to consider in
examining why loan sales and securitization
may be efficient ways of funding certain invest-
ments. Asset-backed lending in its most general
sense is the sale of an asset by its originator,
which separates the financing of the asset from
that of the originator's portfolio.
Imperfect information about the portfolio
choices of intermediaries can help to explain
market-based incentives for asset-backed lend-
ing. The first two papers we discuss below cite
the inability of localized or specialized banks to
diversify portfolio returns as a rationale for fi-
nancial firms to engage in both loan sales and
securitization. The models developed in these
papers formalize this rationale, motivating asset-
backed lending as a means for local borrowers
to tap into nonlocal sources of funds. The second
two models of asset-backed lending emphasize
the differences in the information available to in-
termediaries versus the individuals who hold
their debt prior to investment choices. These
models formalize asset-backed lending as a
means of collateralizing, thus enabling investors
to obtain financing terms that better reflect the
underlying quality of the projects being funded.
Portfolio Risks and
Capital Constraints
While perfect diversification removes the need
to monitor imperfectly observed portfolio risks,
imperfect diversification creates the need for a
more complicated financial structure. For exam-
ple, when banks cannot perfectly diversify risks,
the amount of their equity capital assumes greater
importance. Without sufficient equity capital,
banks may be unable to attract funding in order to
finance risky investments. By buffering potential
portfolio losses, equity capital serves as an alterna-
tive means of mitigating the need for lenders to
monitor an intermediary: It cushions portfolio
losses and thus protects depositors.
Bernanke and Gertler (1987) and Samolyk
(1989a,b) show that when depositors' costs of
monitoring an institution are prohibitive, inter-
mediaries may face market-imposed capital con-
straints on the risks associated with their portfolio
choices. Capital inadequacy arises when a bank isunable to attract funds to finance profitable in-
vestments because it has inadequate capital to
absorb possible portfolio losses.
The key to this result is that it is assumed to be
extremely costly for depositors to monitor the out-
come of a bank's portfolio. Depositors recognize
that banks have the incentive to report large losses
on their risky assets, in effect claiming that they
are unable to meet depositors' claims. Hence,
banks will not be able to attract depositors un-
less they have sufficient capital to cover poten-







Capital constraints can arise because banks are
both unable and unwilling to diversify their port-
folios adequately. Government policies have
affected the incentives for intermediaries—espe-
cially banks and thrifts—to manage portfolio risks
prudently. Portfolio and branching restrictions
have limited the ability of banks and thrifts to di-
versify credit risks as well as the risks associated
with maturity transformation. Regulatory limits on
the types of depository lending, such as the "Qual-
ified Thrift Lender Test," also constrain portfolio
diversification.
:
 1 Finally, the provision of federal-
ly sponsored deposit insurance creates moral haz-
ard problems in both the management of credit
risks and the interest-rate risks associated with
maturity transformation. These policies reduce the
potential for depositors (and regulators) to dele-
gate the monitoring function.
Given the partial deregulation of the banking
industry, these restrictions are probably not as
important an impediment to diversification as
they once were. Ironically, a major factor limit-
ing intermediaries from diversifying and hence
minimizing information costs is the very costs of
identifying, monitoring, and funding borrowers
that make financial contracts and intermediation
important. These costs may cause intermedi-
aries to specialize in lending to certain types of
borrowers (industry versus consumers) or to






Carlstrom and Samolyk (1993) present a model in
which capital constraints motivate one rationale
for off-balance-sheet lending. Their model predicts
that loan sales occur as a response to differences
in project returns across regions that arise when
some regions are capital constrained and others
are not. Similar to the model used by Samolyk
(1989b), banks operate in distinct, informationally
segmented regions or markets. Bankers within a
particular region have a comparative advantage in
supplying loans there because they have better in-
formation about credit conditions or would-be bor-
rowers. However, the inability of banks to diversify
localized portfolios perfectly can cause some
regions to be capital constrained.
1
2
The authors demonstrate that in the absence of
asset-backed lending, a region with a relatively
large set of profitable—albeit risky—investment
opportunities and limited bank capital can be con-
strained. That is, the region will be unable to at-
tract sufficient deposits to fund all of its profitable
investment opportunities. A constrained bank
must channel resources instead into safer but less
profitable investments.
Binding capital constraints cause interregional
differences in returns on projects. These, in turn,
create the incentive for banks in constrained
markets to originate and sell unfunded profitable
investments to banks in unconstrained regions.
Unconstrained banks, though adequately capi-
talized, would not lend to constrained banks via
deposit liabilities because these liabilities are
claims on the constrained banks' entire portfolios,
which nonlocal firms have no comparative advan-
tage in monitoring. Alternatively, unconstrained
bankers will purchase individual projects from
these banks. They recognize that banks are con-
strained because of excess profitable investment
opportunities in their region. Thus, binding capital
constraints give rise to asset-backed lending by al-
lowing a bank to separate the funding of certain
projects from the performance of its portfolio.
• 10 In this discussion, depositors should be understood as either
uninsured depositors or banking regulators.
• 11 The Qualified Thrift Lender Test refers to the regulation that re-
quires thrifts to hold a certain fraction of their portfolio in the form of
home mortgages.
• 12 Capital constraints arise because of short-term variations in
lending opportunities that do not create the incentive for a structural re-
allocation of bank equity capital.Asset-Backed
Lending as a Means
of Delegating
Nonlocal Monitoring
Carlstrom and Samolyk's model shows how cap-
ital constraints in informationally segmented
banking markets can cause banks to sell loans,
facilitating a more efficient allocation of resources.
These capital constraints are one example in
which capital markets may not be as efficient as
suggested by textbooks. Loan sales may arise to
help correct the associated regional imbalances.
Another potential problem with intermedia-
tion is that information costs may cause credit to
be rationed for some borrowers. Credit rationing
exists when someone is unable to obtain credit
even though he or she is (ex ante) identical to a
borrower who does obtain financing. When in-
formation is costless, economic theory predicts
that credit rationing will not arise because loan
rates will increase until the quantity of loans sup-
plied equals the quantity of loans demanded.
Williamson (1986) demonstrates that it may
be efficient for intermediaries that face monitor-
ing costs to ration credit. As in Diamond, he
characterizes banks as issuing claims to a large
number of lenders and lending to a large num-
ber of borrowers. Because of ex post project
monitoring costs, banks issue debt contracts to
many ex ante identical borrowers, monitor
projects only in the event of default, and pay a
noncontingent return to depositors.
Unlike Diamond, who assumes that banks
can fund any number of investments at a given
cost of funds, Williamson analyzes an economy
in which banks face an increasing marginal cost
of funds: They must charge higher loan rates to
offer returns that will attract the funds of inves-
tors with better alternatives. Higher loan rates,
however, lead to greater monitoring costs be-
cause higher interest charges raise the probabil-
ity that borrowers will default on their loans.
Although lenders get all of a project's proceeds
in the event of default, the increase in expected
monitoring costs may actually decrease the ex-
pected return of a loan. In this setting, interme-
diaries may be unwilling to charge higher loan
rates in order to fund more projects and instead
choose to ration credit.
In a related paper, Boyd and Smith (1989) ex-
tend this analysis to show another way in which
asset-backed lending may improve the perform-
ance of informationally segmented credit mar-
kets. As in Carlstrom and Samolyk, differences in
interregional returns on projects lead to a type
of asset-backed lending.
Boyd and Smith consider a variation of the con-
tracting model described by Williamson (1987).
1
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In their model, identical borrowers, whose proj-
ects require costly ex post state verification, con-
tract individually with lenders to supply funds. To
observe the ex post returns on borrowers' invest-
ments, lenders must incur monitoring costs, but
such costs are assumed to be larger for lenders in
other markets. Thus, like Carlstrom and Samolyk's
model, there is a comparative advantage to fund-
ing projects within one's own region. Boyd and
Smith consider two banking regions that differ in
the local ratios of potential lenders to borrowers,
creating a scenario in which a Williamson-type
credit rationing occurs in only one of the regions.
Securitization allows lenders in unrationed
markets to fund projects in rationed markets:
An intermediary pools and monitors the loans
of local borrowers, funding them by issuing
claims to other markets. Like Diamond's model
of intermediation, diversification by this inter-
mediary allows the ultimate investors, lenders
in the unrationed market, to delegate the
monitoring to the intermediary in the market
where the loans are being originated.
Lenders do not find it profitable to fund proj-
ects in other markets directly because of the
large intermarket monitoring costs. However,
asset pooling, which completely diversifies away
the risk of the pool, eliminates the need for in-
vestors to incur the large intermarket costs of
monitoring the underlying assets. All monitoring
takes place locally by the coalition at the lower
intramarket monitoring cost. Similar to Carlstrom
and Samolyk's model, loan sales occur in order
to equalize expected project returns across mar-
kets. Credit rationing, however, may still occur
in markets where assets are being securitized.




In Boyd and Smith's model, securitized loan pools
are originated by a coalition of individual borrow-
ers within one locality, but are funded by lenders
in another. Most mortgage securitization takes
place via an interregional intermediary, which
pools loans from loan originators in many
• 13 Williamson (1987) shows that credit rationing can occur in a
model with debt contracts, where individual borrowers contract with in-
dividual lenders. This paper is similar to his earlier one (Williamson
[19861), except that there are no financial intermediaries.localities. To the extent that interregional diver-
sification is conventionally viewed as an impor-
tant rationale for mortgage securitization, the
Boyd-Smith model is limited in the extent to
which it can be interpreted as a model of the
secondary mortgage market.
Instead of being a model of regional mortgage
securitization, their analysis is a better descrip-
tion of most nonmortgage securitization. They
do not, however, depict an intermediary that
funds a share of its projects off-balance-sheet
through a subsidiary. Rather, each individual
borrower (not a "bank") funds his entire project
along with other borrowers.
Carlstrom and Samolyk depict loan sales and
not securitization. However, they model one im-
portant aspect of nonmortgage asset-backed
lending in the sense that banks fund parts of
their portfolio on- and off-balance-sheet.
These models help explain some of the bene-
fits of both loan sales and securitization. For two
reasons, however, the models are limited in de-
scribing some dimensions of asset-backed mar-
kets. First, both the Carlstrom-Samolyk and Boyd-
Smith models rely on regionally segmented bank-
ing markets to drive their results—an increasingly
less likely scenario given the consolidation of the
depository industry and the increase in nonbank
intermediation. Second, as discussed earlier, secu-
ritized assets are usually backed by some type of
credit enhancements or provide some sort of
recourse for the purchasing party that helps make
them marketable. Neither of these papers explains
why credit enhancements might be an important
part of the securitization process. The next two
papers discuss the importance of credit enhance-






Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) present a model
in which the choice of on- versus off-balance-
sheet funding (which they refer to as the deposit
funding mode [DFM] and securitized funding
mode [SFM], respectively) is a sorting mecha-
nism whereby borrowers choose one or the
other based on the quality of their project. If a
borrower selects the SFM, he must also choose
the degree to which the bank will provide re-
course in the event of default. The degree to
which a loan is collateralized signals the quality
of the asset to nonbank investors. This elimi-
nates the need for them to screen the borrower.
The model consists of borrowers with projects
that differ in quality. Borrowers must choose be-
tween one of two funding modes. If a project is
funded on-balance-sheet, a bank's entire stock of
equity capital effectively collateralizes the project.
The bank screens the borrower to ascertain the
quality of his project, while depositors screen the
bank. This redundancy is necessary because
banks are unable to convey the outcome of their
screening directly to depositors. Under the DFM,
the value of the bank's collateralization and both
of these screening costs are priced into the
borrower's risk-adjusted loan rate.
Alternatively, under the SFM, a bank offers to
fund the project off-balance-sheet by providing
a credit enhancement in the form of bank col-
lateralization. A borrower pays for the amount
collateralized with an up-front fee. Banks screen
borrowers and then announce a fee schedule as-
sociated with a borrower's choice of collaterali-
zation. As with insurance, lower-risk projects
are charged less for any given level of coverage
(collateralization). A borrower's choice of cov-
erage is public information and thus can signal
a project's quality, eliminating the need for the
purchasing party also to screen the asset.
For higher-quality projects, the fee associated
with the borrower's choice of bank collateraliza-
tion is offset by the reduction in depositors' screen-
ing costs. For poorer-quality projects, however, the
fee necessary to purchase collateralization is
greater, outweighing the benefits from the elim-
ination of screening by nonbank investors. Thus,
poorer-quality borrowers forgo the fee and
choose the DFM with full collateralization, al-
though depositors' screening costs will be
priced into their loan rates.
An important implication of this framework is
that higher-quality assets will tend to be securi-
tized, while lower-quality assets will tend to be
held on-balance-sheet. The intuition is as follows:
Higher-quality borrowers receive a lower interest
cost than lower-quality borrowers under either
funding mode. However, because the choice of
collateralization under the SFM produces informa-
tion about project quality and eliminates the need
for asset-backed investors to screen the underly-
ing assets, higher-quality borrowers can take ad-
vantage of low credit enhancement rates to obtain
a better term of finance. Moreover, their cost of
funding is lower despite the increased risk asso-
ciated with less-than-full bank collateralization
from the investors' perspective.
The Greenbaum—Thakor framework repre-
sents an important step in characterizing thetrends in securitization, especially to the extent
that asset-backed lending separates the col-
lateralization and monitoring of the underlying
claims from their funding. Similar to the Boyd—
Smith model, this model depicts asset-backed
lending as a means of eliminating the need for
investors to monitor the performance of the un-
derlying asset(s). Here the reduction in monitor-
ing costs occurs, however, because a borrower's
choice to fund via a coUateralized loan sale signals
project quality and eliminates investors' need to
screen. Alternatively, in Boyd and Smith, the diver-
sification associated with borrowers' pooling of





James (1988) presents a model that characterizes
a different rationale for asset-backed lending. Spe-
cifically, he emphasizes that loan sales with re-
course are a means of obtaining lower funding
costs by separating the cash flows on a particular
claim from those to the unsecured claimants fund-
ing a bank's balance sheet. He argues that loan
sales with recourse are equivalent to a firm issuing
secured debt. Because banks are prohibited from
issuing secured claims, loan sales with recourse
are likely to occur for the same reasons that firms
issue secured debt.
Firms issue secured debt in part to mitigate an
underinvestment problem that may occur with
fixed-rate bond contracts. If firms with outstand-
ing debt are constrained to raise funds by issu-
ing additional unsecured claims, they may forgo
financing certain new profitable projects—in
particular, projects that would reduce the over-
all risk of the firm's portfolio. This occurs be-
cause banks cannot reprice existing unsecured
claims to reflect accurately changes in the risk
of their portfolio due to new asset acquisitions.
Thus, if a firm chooses to issue unsecured claims
to finance a project that reduces portfolio risk,
existing bondholders receive a wealth transfer
from stockholders as the risk-adjusted value of
their claims increases.
James refers to the underinvestment problem
that motivates the use of secured debt as the col-
lateralization hypothesis. The key to this problem
is that banks are locked into a fixed cost of funds
on their liabilities. With secured debt, the existing
bondholders do not have access to the newly ac-
quired assets should the firm declare bankruptcy.
Since regulations restrict banks and thrifts from is-
suing secured debt, loan sales with recourse—
by separating the funding of new projects from
that of a firm's existing investments—can mitigate
a potential underinvestment problem.
Banks cannot issue secured debt, so the ex-
tent to which they fund their portfolios by issu-
ing term liabilities such as certificates of deposit
(CDs) may motivate them to finance certain as-
sets off-balance-sheet with some form of
recourse. Still, James' model may be limited as
an explanation for asset-backed lending by
banks and thrifts, because the bulk of their
liabilities are short-term deposits. Such liabilities
have a return that can be readjusted to reflect
the risk of a bank's portfolio after new assets are
acquired. Thus, any wealth transfers from bank
equityholders to depositors (in an unregulated





In reality, the fact that banks are insured, and that
the FDIC (not insured depositors) must consider
the risk of a bank's portfolio, complicates this
analysis. As the residual claimant of a bank's as-
sets, the FDIC, not insured depositors, bears the
credit risk of these assets. If capital requirements
and deposit insurance premiums were correctly
priced (and effectively repriced) to reflect a bank's
risk, the incentives for banks to engage in asset-
backed lending would be reduced. To the extent,
however, that the FDIC does not price the provi-
sion of insurance to reflect a bank's risk accurately,
James' model motivates asset-backed lending.
The interpretation here is that safer assets will be
funded off-balance-sheet to maximize the value of
FDIC insurance to bank equityholders.
The models in both James and Greenbaum
and Thakor explain why firms would provide
credit enhancements for their off-balance-sheet
funding. In reality, these enhancements are gen-
erally issued by a third party—to some degree
because of regulations. This is especially true
for bank loan sales, as loans sold with recourse
are viewed as on-balance-sheet assets in the as-
sessments of capital requirements. In spite of these
limitations, however, these frameworks are useful
in characterizing a widely accepted rationale for
the proliferation of nonmortgage securitization: to
separate the securitized assets from the general
portfolios of financial intermediaries.The proliferation of asset-backed lending is
merely one way that the financial scene is chang-
ing. As evidenced by nonbank activities in this
market, securitization is both the result of techno-
logical innovations in information production and
an artifact of banking regulations. In this paper,
we have focused primarily on models that formal-
ize market-based reasons for asset-backed lend-
ing. However, the existence of government
regulations, in tandem with the provision of the
federal safety net, is widely viewed as a significant
factor impacting both the volume of securitization




Regulatory models of asset-backed lending gen-
erally focus on how regulations impact a bank's
choice of funding. For example, Benveniste and
Berger (1987) argue that credit enhancements
for asset-backed securities allow banks to maxi-
mize the value of deposit insurance by issuing
claims that are senior to those of the FDIC. Al-
though their argument is similar to that posited
by James, he argues that this adverse tendency
is offset by the likelihood that loan sales backed
by SLCs mitigate the underinvestment problem.
The incentive to shift risk to the FDIC is also
limited by the marketplace. The creditworthiness
of both the loans being securitized and the issuer
of credit enhancements affects the rating of a pool.
Thus, banks that issue SLCs are generally lower-
risk institutions.
Other regulatory incentives for banks to en-
gage in asset-backed lending are the regulatory
taxes associated with on-balance-sheet funding.
For example, capital requirements—the mini-
mum legal fraction of an investment that must
be held as equity capital—are popularly viewed
as the primary regulatory incentive for banks
and thrifts to sell assets. These requirements are
designed to protect the FDIC and uninsured
depositors in the case of bank failure.
Regulation-based models, however, empha-
size that if capital requirements on a particular
class of loans are greater than merited by the
inherent risk of the claims, banks will have an
incentive to either sell or securitize the loan.
1
4
That is, there will be an incentive to move a loan
from on-balance-sheet, where it is subject to capital
requirements, to off-balance-sheet, where it is not.
14 See Pennacchi (1988).
This will be the case when the cost of the reg-
ulated equity buffer exceeds the cost of market-
ing the claims.
Two other regulatory taxes that have been cited
as potential inducements for asset-backed lending
are fractional reserve requirements and flat-rate
FDIC insurance premiums on deposit liabilities.
These assessments are viewed as raising the cost
of deposit funding, thus encouraging depository
institutions to fund loans off-balance-sheet. Yet,
securitization has continued to expand in spite of
decreases in the reserve requirements set by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. In addition, to the extent that deposit in-
surance is subsidized, flat-rate deposit insurance
premiums are unlikely to be a major factor in the
growth of securitization. For example, if the
premiums charged to insure the deposits funding
relatively risky loans allow an institution to obtain
funds more cheaply than from other sources, then
even though there are other costs associated with
deposit funding, this may be a relatively cheap
source of finance. Because deposit insurance
premiums are currently not risk based, they may
still have the undesirable effect of causing banks
to securitize their safest and most liquid loans.
V. Conclusion
Although market-based reasons are an impor-
tant factor driving off-balance-sheet lending,
this type of lending may still impact the risk of
lending that is funded on banks' balance sheets.
For example, Greenbaum and Thakor's model
predicts that the safest assets will be securitized
while the risky assets will be held on-balance-
sheet. Regulations provide similar incentives for
securitizing the safest assets. Because these fac-
tors can clearly impact the exposure of the
FDIC, policymakers are understandably con-
cerned about the rapid growth of this practice.
In its role as an insurer, the government aims
to maintain the solvency of the insurance fund
by regulating deposit insurance premiums and
capital requirements. But it is precisely these as-
sessments that can affect the risks undertaken
by depository institutions, as regulatory costs
create an incentive for banks to shrink their
balance sheets by securitizing loans.
However, the trend toward asset-backed
lending should not be viewed as either a boon
for nonbank competitors or the bane of the FDIC.
Depository institutions can earn fee income for
participating in various dimensions of the secu-
ritization process. Moreover, with prudent
regulatory supervision of banks' off-balance-sheet activities, asset-backed lending can miti-
gate the rising costs of the federal safety net as it
reduces the share of credit funded on the books
of depository institutions. Thus, securitization is
better viewed as an important innovation in the
financial sector—one that allows new suppliers of
credit to enter the market and existing ones to inter-
mediate credit more efficiently.
References
Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Allen N. Berger.
"Securitization with Recourse: An Instrument
that Offers Uninsured Bank Depositors Se-
quential Claims," Journal of Banking and
Finance, vol. 11, no. 3 (September 1987), pp.
403-24.
Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler. "Banking and
Macroeconomic Equilibrium," in William A.
Barnett and Kenneth Singleton, eds., New Ap-
proaches to Monetary Economics. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 89-111.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Anjan V. Thakor. "Con-
temporary Banking Theory," Indiana Univer-
sity Discussion Paper 504, November 1991.
Boyd, John H., and Bruce D. Smith. "Securitiza-
tion and the Efficient Allocation of Invest-
ment Capital," Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Working Paper 408, May 1989.
Carlstrom, Charles T., and Katherine A. Samolyk.
"Loan Sales as a Response to Market-Based
Capital Constraints," Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Working Paper, 1993 (forthcoming).
Diamond, Douglas W. "Financial Intermediation
and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, vol. 51, no. 3 (July 1984), pp.
393-414.
Gertler, Mark. "Financial Structure and Aggre-
gate Economic Activity: An Overview," Jour-
nal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.20,
no. 3 (August 1988), pp. 559-88.
Gorton, Gary B., and Joseph G. Haubrich. "The
Loan Sales Market," in George G. Kaufman,
ed., Research in Financial Services; Private
and Public Policy, vol. 2 (1990), pp. 85-135.
Greenbaum, Stuart I., and Anjan V. Thakor.
"Bank Funding Modes: Securitization versus
Deposits," Journal of Banking and Finance,
vol. 11, no. 3 (September 1987), pp. 379-401.
James, Christopher. "The Use of Loan Sales and
Standby Letters of Credit by Commercial
Banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
22, no. 3 (November 1988), pp. 395-422.
McCulloch, J. Huston. "Misintermediation and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations," Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 8, no. 1 (July
1981), pp. 103-15.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. "The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the
Theory of Investment," American Economic
Review, vol. 48, no. 3 (June 1958), pp. 261-97.
Mookherjee, Dilip, and Ivan Png. "Optimal
Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 104,
no. 2 (May 1989), pp. 399-415.
Pavel, Christine. "Securitization," Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives, vol.
10, no. 4 (July/August 1986), pp. 16-31.
Pennacchi, George G. "Loan Sales and the Cost
of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, vol.
43, no. 2 0une 1988), pp. 375-96.
Ramakrishnan, Ram T.S., and Anjan V. Thakor. "In-
formation Reliability and a Theory of Financial
Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies,
vol. 51, no. 3 (July 1984), pp. 415-32.
Samolyk, Katherine A. "Portfolio Risks and Bank
Asset Choice," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, Working Paper 8913, October 1989a.
. "The Role of Banks in Influencing
Regional Flows of Funds," Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 8914,
November 1989b.
Townsend, Robert M. "Optimal Contracts and
Competitive Markets with Costly State Verifi-
cation," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 21,
no. 2 (October 1979), pp. 265-93.Williamson, Stephen D. "Costly Monitoring,
Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium
Credit Rationing," Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 18, no. 2 (September 1986),
pp. 159-79.
. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts,
and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 102, no. 1
(February 1987), pp. 135-45.